By Suhaib Farooq | Personal geopolitical analysis | 30 October 2026
I have been thinking about the confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States. It seems to me that both sides see serious dangers in the future, and that is why it can be so difficult for them to accept a compromise in the present.
My first question is this: if Iran were allowed to operate nuclear facilities for electricity and other peaceful uses, with genuine international monitoring and no nuclear weapons, could that become the basis for a settlement? Or would the fear of Iran becoming more powerful make such an agreement unacceptable to its opponents?
The agreement I imagine
I can imagine a possible arrangement in which Iran retains a peaceful nuclear-energy program but accepts inspections, clear restrictions and a way for international monitors to verify that the program is not being diverted toward weapons. In return, countries could discuss security assurances and ways to reduce confrontation.
I am not saying that such an agreement would be easy. Trust is a major problem. If one side believes the other may hide dangerous activities, a promise on paper may not be enough. Inspection and verification would be essential.
There is also a difference between the right to peaceful nuclear technology and an unrestricted ability to accumulate highly enriched uranium. I think this distinction needs to be at the center of negotiations rather than hidden behind slogans.
Why I think Israel has a different calculation
From the way I understand Israel’s security concerns, its leaders may fear that even a non-nuclear-armed Iran could become a stronger regional rival if its economy, technology and military systems recover. I wonder whether the fear is about Iran’s future capability as much as its current capability.
I have also considered whether religious beliefs and ideas about a future Messiah influence the thinking of some political or religious groups in Israel. Religious beliefs do shape the views of some people, but I do not know that they explain the decisions of the entire Israeli government or society. The publicly stated security concerns about Iran’s nuclear and missile programs must be considered separately.
I think there is a danger when we assume that every person in a country shares one motive. In reality, governments contain many competing political and security interests.
What the United States changes
The United States is a major supporter of Israel, and its military involvement changes the balance dramatically. Iran may consider a direct confrontation with American forces extraordinarily costly. At the same time, US leaders may believe they need to prevent Iran from gaining the ability to build nuclear weapons.
For me, that creates the same dilemma I see elsewhere: showing strength might push an opponent toward negotiation, but it might also convince that opponent to build more capability so it is less vulnerable in the future.
What we can and cannot say about Iran’s nuclear program now
I originally worried that Iran might simply restart its nuclear program and ignore the danger of being attacked again. But that fear should not be stated as an established event. Reporting on October 29, 2026, said the International Atomic Energy Agency had found no evidence that Iran had begun repairing damaged nuclear facilities, while warning that it could not fully verify the status of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.
This uncertainty is itself serious. When inspectors cannot confirm the complete situation, governments may act on their worst fears. That increases the value of diplomacy and credible monitoring.
Why I think an agreement is both necessary and difficult
If Iran accepted limits and inspections and the other parties trusted them, tensions might decrease. But if Israeli or American leaders believed Iran could later use civilian infrastructure to build military capabilities, they might continue demanding stronger restrictions. Iran, meanwhile, may see strict limitations as an attack on its sovereignty and future development.
That is why I do not think the problem can be solved by simply saying either ‘allow Iran everything’ or ‘destroy Iran’s capabilities.’ The real challenge is finding arrangements that protect civilian energy use while reducing the danger of nuclear weapons and another war.
My conclusion
My concern is that every time diplomacy fails, all sides may become more determined to increase their military power. One side calls it protection. The other sees a threat. Then the next round of confrontation becomes more dangerous than the last. I think that cycle needs to be understood if we want to understand why this conflict is so difficult to resolve.
Sources and context: US Congressional Research Service: Iran and nuclear weapons production (October 2026); Associated Press: October 29 IAEA update; European Council: October 2026 position on the Middle East.
Editorial note: The article distinguishes the author’s suggested diplomatic outcome and questions about motivations from verified statements about nuclear inspections. No religious or national community is presented as having one uniform motive.
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